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SUMMARY 
In this paper we have investigated the impact of changes in demand and 
supply conditions and government policy instruments on output and em-
ployment responses at industry level. The output response seems to be in 
line with the general expectation: firms respond positively to changes in do-
mestic or foreign demand (and the industry output increases too). Unit la-
bour costs seem to have a negative impact while investment activities have a 
positive impact on the response. Government policy instruments, on the other 
hand, do not seem to impact the output response of firms (and thus of in-
dustries).  
We have measured industrial restructuring in a particular way: the 
absolute value of changes in the relative share of each industry in total 
manufacturing employment, i.e., restructuring is the outcome of the inter-
vention by the firms’ management irrespective of whether it has resulted in 
a reduction or an increase in employment (and whether the reduction in 
employment has been the outcome of passive or active restructuring). Had 
we not used the absolute value of change, the implication would have been 
that a decrease in demand, e.g., would have slowed down the restructuring 
process.  
Given our definition of restructuring, we have shown that adversity 
forces firms’ managers to react. A decline in domestic demand or exports, 
an increase in labour cost, and a decline in profitability will all lead to re-
structuring. The relationship is stronger in some countries than others and 
depends on the functional form used. Again, government policy instruments 
do not seem to have a strong impact on the process. This will support the 
view that the ultimate motives for firms to lobby governments (sometime 
successfully) to use their resources in an attempt to speed up the restruc-
turing process through beneficial taxes and subsidies are to maintain the 
status quo and postpone the painful restructuring process.  
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INTRODUCTION* 
The period of transition to a market sys-
tem has been associated with massive 
industrial restructuring in most transition 
economies. Not only has the relative im-
portance and contribution of different 
economic activities changed, there has 
also been a significant change within the 
manufacturing sector. Changes in indus-
trial structure reflect the changing mar-
ket conditions, both domestic and inter-
national, and the state of competition as 
well as the behaviour of the economic 
agents involved. A major dimension of 
the change in industrial structure, or 
perhaps an outcome of this change, has 
been the changing competitiveness of in-
dustries in these economies, on both do-
mestic and on international markets.1 A 
significant increase in international trade 
in almost all countries of the region has 
further speeded up the restructuring 
process. 
The restructuring process and 
changing competitiveness have been stud-
ied in detail by many authors, though 
mostly either at firm level or national 
(macro) level. This paper considers the 
restructuring process at the industry 
level and attempts to unravel the causes 
and effects of this process. Unlike much 
of the research on this WP (which have 
                                                 
* This paper is a result of the project 'Changes 
in Industrial Competitiveness as a Factor of Inte-
gration: Identifying Challenges of the Enlarged 
Single European Market' funded by the 5th 
Framework Programme of the European Commu-
nity (Ref. HPSE-CT-2002-00148). The authors are 
solely responsible for the content of the paper. It 
does not represent the opinion of the Community 
and the Community is not responsible for any 
use that might be made of the data appearing 
therein. We thank Dariusz Winiek (Warsaw 
School of Economics) for helpful suggestions in 
the early stage of this research. 
1  In this paper, the term industry refers to the 
collection of firms producing similar goods (close 
substitutes and goods produced by technologically 
similar processes). In statistical terms, it is repre-
sented by the three-digit industries according to 
NACE classification. 
employed rank correlation methodology), 
this paper attempts to use OLS and 
panel data techniques to investigate the 
factors influencing industrial restructur-
ing. More specifically, the aim of this 
paper is to identify the relative strength 
of demand and supply side factors and 
government policy instruments which 
contribute to the process of industrial 
restructuring. In the next stage of re-
search, using the same methodology, the 
relationship between industrial restructur-
ing and changing competitiveness will be 
investigated. 
The paper is divided into four sec-
tions. In the first section we discuss the 
mechanism through which changing mar-
ket conditions affect the firms’ decision 
to increase or decrease its out-
put/employment. In the second section, 
we introduce a model of industrial re-
structuring based on variations in both 
demand and supply conditions. In the 
third section we provide the empirical 
evidence on the restructuring process. 
Section four concludes. 
1) WHAT CAUSES 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE? 
Changes in the structure of the national 
economy and the manufacturing sector 
have been a fundamental feature of the 
process of transition. The structure of 
the economy, and the manufacturing sec-
tor, were severely distorted under the 
socialist system because of the particular 
method of resource allocation and the 
dominance or political criteria over eco-
nomic criteria associated with central 
planning. As a result, the industrial sec-
tor (particularly the heavy industry, 
chemicals and extractive branches) had 
grown beyond that justified by the par-
ticular level of development while the 
light industries, trade and services made 
a much smaller contribution to the total 
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economic activity. The national output 
was characterised by the low level of 
international trade, a small number of 
products competitive on the international 
market, and a large volume of low 
quality goods not demanded by the con-
sumers (see Winiecki, 1988; Lipowski, 
1998, among others). 
With the introduction of competi-
tion, the old economic structure began 
to change. The freedom of entry and the 
liberalisation of foreign trade meant that 
the market for unwanted or low quality 
goods disappeared and that for new 
products and services began to develop 
and enlarge. Similarly, as the hard 
budget constraint set in, enterprises pro-
ducing non-viable (loss making) products 
had to either reduce or cease the pro-
duction of such goods, or exit the mar-
ket altogether. Although in majority of 
enterprises, the initial restructuring 
measures (reductions in output and em-
ployment) were passive, or defensive, 
embarked upon as short term survival 
measures, they had to be followed by 
more long term and strategic measures 
for enterprises to prosper and grow 
(Grosfeld and Roland, 1995). 
In the course of systemic change, 
these economies went through an ‘ad-
justment’ process, one in which the 
structure of the economy and the manu-
facturing industry changed and became 
more compatible with those of a market 
economy involved in international trade. 
The massive expansion and reorientation 
of exports and imports of these coun-
tries contributed significantly to this ad-
justment process.  
The analysis of motivations or in-
centives for restructuring was an impor-
tant question which attracted the atten-
tion of many transition economists in the 
first decade of transition, and to which 
no conclusive answer has yet been given. 
Was it changes in demand that led firms 
to produce goods wanted by the con-
sumers and discontinue or reduce the 
output of unwanted goods? Was it the 
enterprise managers’ desire to improve 
the performance of their company by 
altering the organisation of the produc-
tion process in order to increase produc-
tivity and stay in business? Or was it 
the pressure of competition, especially 
from imported goods that imposed a 
bankruptcy threat on firms and forced 
them to embark on effective restructur-
ing? While there is no doubt that all 
these factors (and some others) have 
contributed to the restructuring process, 
the relative importance of these factors 
are not known. Furthermore, it should 
be remembered that decisions which ul-
timately result in the restructuring of a 
firm are made by firm managers operat-
ing under uncertain conditions and aim-
ing to optimise their own and their 
firms’ positions. These motives and their 
impact on individual firms are of course 
unobservable – especially in a study 
which concentrates on ‘industries’ and 
not on ‘firms’ – but their impact on 
employment and output decisions are 
known and allow us to draw inferences 
on the process. 
The restructuring of a firm, and 
by implication the industry to which the 
firm (and similar firms) belong, may 
take a number of forms. In the initial 
stage, given the overstaffing typical of 
socialist enterprises, a major task facing 
most firms was to reduce the level of 
employment. In most cases, this was a 
defensive mechanism, a response to pres-
sures of competition and a means of 
survival. Depending on the hardness of 
budget constraint facing each firm, a 
certain amount of labour shedding took 
place (more in some and less in others). 
In all the three countries under consid-
eration, firms underwent this adjustment 
process – with very similar results (Bal-
cerowicz, et al., 1998). It is important to 
note that although a decline in employ-
ment may be regarded as an undesirable 
side effect of the adjustment process, 
especially from the politicians’ point of 
view, it nevertheless represents the firm’s 
attempt to restructure – and a positive 
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step from the point of view of the firm’s 
long term survival. At the same time, 
firms which are managed better and 
have better market conditions and op-
portunities and may be able to increase 
employment, will also have been under-
going the restructuring process. In other 
words, jobs lost and jobs created are 
both indicators of restructuring (see 
Mancellari et al., 1996 and Jackman and 
Pauna, 1994 for a similar approach).  
We start by looking at the impact 
of various factors on firms’ output and 
employment decisions.  
1.1. The impact of demand 
The basic argument is that changes in 
demand for a product will result in 
changes in output of firms producing 
that product, or a change in that indus-
try’s output. Depending on how rapidly 
producers respond to changes in de-
mand, prices may also change, providing 
additional information and incentive for 
producers to change their output. Thus 
SALES(t) = a + b D(t) + c EXP(t) + 
d P(t) + e SECTOR + ε 
SAL represents the value of output 
(or sales) of an industry, D is domestic 
demand, X is the industry’s exports (for-
eign demand), P is the producers’ price 
index for that industry and I is a 
dummy representing industry groups 
(two-digit industries). Substituting D with 
SALES + M – X, the following estimat-
able equation will be obtained: 
SALESt = a + b (SALESt+IMPt-EXPt) + 
c EXPt + d Pt + e I + ε 
Or: SALESt =a1 + a2 IMPt + a3 EXPt + 
a4 Pt + a5 SECTOR + ε (1) 
Although this is a simple model of 
identifying the impact of demand on 
firms (and industries) decisions, it can 
unambiguously point to the impact of 
demand and provide the initial step to-
wards a broader estimation of output 
and employment decisions of firms. Using 
our data set of around 90 three-digit 
industries for the period under consid-
eration for each country, we can esti-
mate this simple model for the three 
countries under consideration (see Section 
3).  
A different version of this idea has 
been put forward by Havlik (1995 and 
2000) where he argues that the adjust-
ment process is guided by and reflected 
in the reorientation of trade (which are 
included in the above equations). 
1.2. The impact of supply factors 
The change in output and employment of 
firms, which ultimately results in the re-
structuring of the manufacturing indus-
try, may also be motivated by supply 
side factors such as changes in input 
prices and the firm’s choice of technol-
ogy and input combinations. In particu-
lar, under competitive conditions (and a 
hard budget constraint regime), firms 
will try to reduce their unit costs to en-
sure their survival as well as increasing 
their profits. Enterprise managers play a 
particularly important part here: those 
with foresight and initiative embark ac-
tively on reducing input costs, improving 
the production process, reducing waste, 
raising the quality of their products (and 
their firms’ image and standing) and in-
crease productivity. In short, they engage 
in active restructuring. Furthermore, 
firms may embark on policies or strate-
gies designed to strengthen their market 
position – investment, research and de-
velopment, advertising, product differen-
tiation, etc. Consequently, we can develop 
another simple model to assess the im-
pact of supply condition on an industry’s 
output and employment: 
SALESt = a1 + a2 ULCt + a3 UMCt + 
a4 INVEMPt + a5 SECTOR + ε  (2) 
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ULC and UMC represent unit la-
bour cost and unit material cost, and 
INVEMP is the investment per employee 
of the industry (its capital intensity). As 
with Model (1), it is possible to use this 
simple model to assess the broad direc-
tion of the impact of supply side factors 
on industries’ output and employment. 
The results are presented in Section 3.  
1.3. The impact of government 
instruments 
The restructuring process may also be 
affected by policy instruments such as 
taxes and subsidies. Many policy makers 
believe that by offering tax incentives or 
subsidies they will provide the firms with 
a breathing space in which they can 
withstand the financial stress during the 
adjustment process and will be encour-
aged to undertake restructuring. Alterna-
tively, it has been argued that the gov-
ernment’s attempt to provide a cushion 
for the enterprise during financial dis-
tress will be treated as the continuation 
of the soft budget constraint regime and 
would only distort the incentive system 
by giving the wrong signal to enterprise 
managers and enable them to postpone 
unpopular decisions.2  
The main instruments of govern-
ment policy are taxes, direct subsidies, 
grants, cheap loans, guarantees and ul-
timately equity participation. Most, 
though not all, of these areas are gov-
erned by laws on ‘state aid’ which came 
into being in the long period of pre-
accession negotiations (see Hashi and Ha-
jdukovic, 2004 for details). While state 
                                                 
2 For the example of large loss making Polish 
enterprises (iron and steel, coal, railways, ship-
yards, etc.) which absorbed huge quantities of 
direct and indirect subsidies during the 1990s 
without significant restructuring, see Neneman 
and Sowa (2002) and Hashi and Balcerowicz 
(2004). For a related study on the impact of 
state aid in EU countries, see Fingleton, et al. 
(1999). 
aid aimed at ‘rescue and restructuring’ 
is allowed under certain conditions, its 
distortionary effect is never denied – it 
is rather argued that the positive impact 
of restructuring outweighs the distortion-
ary effect of intervention. However, there 
is no empirical evidence to support this 
argument.3 For the purpose of the pre-
sent paper, we identify two main indica-
tors of government policy instruments, 
taxes and subsidies, which affect the 
firms’ decision making process, and by 
implication the output and employment 
levels of industries. Taxes refer to all 
types of taxes paid by firms (corporate 
income tax, wage tax, local taxes, etc.) 
and subsidies refer to the total of the 
variety of supports firms receive from 
the state (or a portion of these, depend-
ing on the availability of data). 
We can now combine the above 
three sets of factors in order to estimate 
a model including all factors which 
could potentially influence the industry’s 
output and employment levels.  
SALESt = a1 +a2IMPt + a3EXPt + 
a4 Pt + a5 ULCt + a6UMCt + 
a7INVEMPt + a7 TAXt +a8 SUBt + 
a9 SECTOR + ε   (3) 
The results of the estimation proce-
dure are presented and discussed in Sec-
tion 3. 
2) MEASURING STRUCTURAL 
CHANGE 
Industrial restructuring is the outcome of 
a number of processes. Output and em-
ployment in different industries change 
                                                 
3  It is sometimes stated that many companies 
receiving state aid are operating efficiently and 
are even quoted on foreign stock markets (the 
example of such companies in Israel was put 
forward at the Project’s mid-term conference in 
Brussels in November 2004). But such casual 
observations cannot be used as substitutes for 
empirical investigations. 
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at different rates because: (a) they face 
different demands; (b) they are subject 
to different production conditions with 
respect to the intensity of factor usage 
and technology; and (c) firms’ managers 
behave differently in the uncertain condi-
tions of transition.  The restructuring at 
firm level leads to changes in output 
and employment in the industry and as 
different firms in different industries 
have managers with differing abilities 
and react differently to changes in input 
prices and technological possibilities, the 
pace of change in different industries 
will be different – thus industrial re-
structuring. Thus, in principle, the three 
sets of factors explained above will also 
influence industrial restructuring. 
The measurement of structural 
change, particularly its representation by 
one indicator, has always been a prob-
lem for researchers (including those in-
volved in this WP). Changes in output of 
different industries, referred to in the 
preceding section, will also be associated 
with changes in employment levels 
though these will not be proportionate to 
each other or have the same ranking as 
each other, because of differences in 
productivity changes taking place in the 
economy at the same time. Given the so-
cial and political difficulties of reducing 
employment in the countries under con-
sideration, it seems sensible to use 
changes in employment as the main indi-
cator of restructuring – and whether 
this change is positive or negative, it still 
represents a contribution to the struc-
tural change effort. We therefore use 
the absolute value of changes in the 
share of each industry in total manufac-
turing employment (from one year to 
next) as the main indicator of industrial 
restructuring. 
In addition to the above demand 
and supply factors, enterprise managers 
also change their performance (especially 
if negative). When firms do badly, effec-
tive managers may take poor perform-
ance as warning and are spurred into 
action. They have to engage in more se-
rious restructuring in order to turn the 
tide. Profitability, measured by the ratio 
of profits (after tax) to sales, lagged 
once, will be used to demonstrate this. 
We propose to use the following model 
to investigate the impact of the four sets 
of factors (discussed earlier) on the re-
structuring process. 
RIt = a1 +a2 Dt + a3EXPt + a4 Pt + 
a5 ULCt + a6UMCt + a7INVEMPt + 
a7 TAXt + a8 SUBt + a9 PROF(t-1) + 
a10 SECTOR + ε (4) 
Where RIt is the index of restruc-
turing, showing the change in the indus-
try’s share of employment in total manu-
facturing from t-1 to t, TAX and SUB 
are the total of taxes paid and subsidies 
received by the firms in each industry. 
As with the previous equations, it is also 
important to check the lagged version of 
this model, i.e., changes in demand, 
costs, etc. will affect the employment lev-
els in subsequent years. 
In some cases, such as Hungary, 
where the information on changes in 
employment are available at firm level, it 
is possible to disaggregate changes in an 
industry’s employment level by separating 
those firms that have had to reduce 
their employment level from those that 
have been able to expand their work 
force. The structural change indicator 
should provide information, and take 
into consideration both employment de-
crease and employment increase, thus the 
idea of using the sum of jobs lost and 
jobs created in each industry.4  
3) EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we present the result of 
the estimation process applied to models 
1 to 4 in the above sections. We shall 
                                                 
4  This result is not reported here but is avail-
able from the authors. It will appear in the next 
revision of the paper. 
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first briefly explain the data used in the 
research and then discuss the empirical 
results.  
3.1. Data 
The empirical work in this paper is 
based on the data for around 90 three-
digit industries in the manufacturing sec-
tor of the three countries under consid-
eration. Industries have been classified 
according to the NACE classification 
(Rev. 3). The period of analysis varies 
from country to country depending on 
the availability of data, with the longest 
time period being available for Poland 
(1995–2001), followed by the Czech Re-
public (1997–2001) and Hungary (1998–
2001). 
The data used for this study has 
been obtained from a variety of sources. 
For the Czech Republic, the data on the 
domestic operation of industries is based 
on P-501 questionnaire and is obtained 
from the Czech Statistical Office. The 
foreign trade data originates from for-
eign trade statistics of the office. All 
data used were converted to euros, us-
ing average annual exchange rates pub-
lished by the Czech National Bank. Data 
is restricted to companies employing 
more than 20 individuals.  
The data on Hungarian manufac-
turing industries are based on the firm-
level dataset obtained from the Hungar-
ian Tax Authority. The data on foreign 
trade was extrapolated from COMEXT 
database. Data from these databases 
were predominantly in Hungarian forints. 
As some variables were provided in eu-
ros, average annual foreign exchange 
rates published by the Hungarian Na-
tional Bank were applied to convert the 
data into forints. 
The Polish data is based on the F01 
questionnaire form completed by all 
firms and processed by the Central Sta-
tistical Office. Trade data was based on 
KWIU form, which includes re-exports 
and also broader categories compared to 
the F01 form. These two datasets show 
strong correlation and are based on 
classification comparable to NACE classi-
fication. We have opted for KWIU form 
since, unlike F01, it provides data for 
both imports and exports, thus making 
comparison and calculations possible. 
Although the data used in this 
study comes from reliable sources such 
as the national statistical agencies and 
Eurostat, the method of collection and 
the coverage of data are different in 
various countries, with some including all 
firms and others including only firms 
with over 20 employees. Moreover, the 
foreign trade data is generally collected 
according to ‘trade classification’ and 
then converted to ‘industrial classifica-
tion’, thus introducing some element of 
inaccuracy in the process. Moreover, the 
foreign trade data sometime include ‘re-
exports’ which, if large, can distort the 
calculations.5 
The precise definition of variables 
used is given in Table 1. Table 2 pro-
vides the summary statistics for all vari-
ables used in the estimation process. 
3.2. Results 
We start with Model (1), trying to check 
the impact of demand factors on the 
output and employment of industries.6 
Table 3 represents the results of the es-
timation process. 
Although, as we said earlier, this 
model is fairly simple, it does reflect a 
basic underlying principle – that firms 
                                                 
5 If re-exports are large (sales – exports) may 
be negative and market shares may be negative. 
6  At this stage we present the results for varia-
tions in output (or value of output to be more 
precise) only. The estimation will also be repeated 
for employment. 
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will have an incentive (or will be forced) 
to respond to changes in domestic 
and/or foreign demand by increasing or 
reducing their output and employment. If 
sufficient firms respond in this form, 
there will be an identical response at 
industry level. Clearly, as expected, both 
domestic and foreign demand have a 
positive and significant impact on the 
output of industries. The same pattern is 
displayed in all three countries too. 
Moreover, although we have only pre-
sented one functional form (Log-Log) in 
Table 3, the impact is quite robust and 
remains significant in a whole variety of 
other functional forms too. The test of 
‘joint significance’ and chi-sq test also 
produce satisfactory results.7 
We can now turn to Model (2), 
showing the impact of costs and supply 
factors. Table 4 represents the results. 
Unit labour cost always has a negative 
and significant impact on output while 
unit material cost is rather insignificant. 
An increase in unit labour cost, other 
things being unchanged, will lead to a 
reduction in use of labour and thus a 
fall in employment. The same relation 
does not seem to hold for material cost. 
Investment intensity, measured by invest-
ment per employee also has a positive 
and significant impact on output. Again, 
this should be expected – investment is 
an important signal of the managers’ 
active engagement and their intent to 
restructure, and will have a positive im-
pact on sales. As in the previous model, 
the reactions at firm level, if present in 
sufficient number of firms, will also be 
displayed at industry level. Interestingly, 
the relationship is the same in all three 
countries and, as in Model (1), is robust 
and remains unchanged under different 
functional forms. 
                                                 
7 We need to check for the non-linearity of the 
relationship by introducing squared terms in the 
model. This will be done in the next revision. 
Similarly, we need to choose between the fixed 
and random effect models using appropriate 
tests. 
The result of the estimation of 
Model (3) is presented in Table 5 where 
the impact of demand and supply fac-
tors as well as government policy in-
struments are all brought together in 
one equation. The most interesting aspect 
of this table is that the main variables 
(which were looked at separately) have 
retained their significance and sign. Ex-
ports and imports are both positive and 
significant, and unit labour cost is nega-
tive and significant, in all three coun-
tries. The relationships are again robust 
and remain the same in a variety of 
functional forms, though only the loga-
rithmic form is reported in Table 3. The 
investment intensity is less robust – it 
remains positive and significant only in 
some functional forms in all countries. 
Taxes and subsidies do not seem to 
have any significant impact on firms’ 
output decisions, and are certainly not 
robust. In the functional forms presented 
in Table 3, taxes are significant and 
negative only in Hungary. Subsidies are 
not significant in any country. In all 
these countries, there is a commonly held 
view that an increase in taxes will have 
a negative impact on the output of firms 
while an increase in subsidy will have 
the opposite effect. This view is not sup-
ported by the evidence encountered in 
this study. Taxes and subsidies may also 
generate other effects (firms trying to 
attract government support in order to 
maintain the status quo and postpone the 
restructuring process) which would 
weaken the expected impact. Thus, over-
all, it seems government intervention 
through taxes and subsidies is unlikely to 
have a definitive positive impact on the 
firms’ (and industries’) adjustment proc-
ess. In the light of the continuing debate 
on the effectiveness of government policy 
in the transition period, this is an impor-
tant conclusion. 
Finally, we can turn to the estima-
tion of the Restructuring, i.e., Model (4). 
The results for this estimation are pre-
sented in Table 6. The estimation of the 
restructuring equations is less straight 
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forward than those of ‘output response’ 
equations. Before discussing the specific 
features of this table, we should point 
out that here we consider the adjustment 
process not in terms of output of indi-
vidual industries (as in Table 5) but in 
terms of the relative employment re-
sponse of each industry (relative to total 
manufacturing employment). The impact 
of the same independent variables are 
therefore different now that in the previ-
ous table, partly because we look at a 
different variable and partly because 
they are moderated by the nature of the 
dependent variable.  
Here, the main feature of the table 
is that industrial restructuring is a re-
sponse to adverse conditions: when do-
mestic demand or export demand falls, 
firms have to react and engage in poli-
cies which enable them to survive (i.e., 
restructure). Of course various firms in 
various industries respond differently and 
the final outcome in various industries 
will be different. In Hungary and the 
Czech Republic domestic demand has a 
negative and significant impact while in 
Poland the impact is insignificant. The 
same principle seems to apply to unit 
labour costs – when costs rise, firms 
begin to react and adjust their inputs. 
But here the impact is significant only in 
the Czech Republic but not in the other 
two countries. The impact of unit mate-
rial cost is positive (most probably due 
to the improvement in the quality of in-
puts). But this is only significant in one 
country (the Czech Republic), and even 
there, only in some functional forms.  
Profitability seems to impact the 
process in the same way: when it de-
clines, firms react and try to improve 
their situation, thus engaging in restruc-
turing. In both Poland and Hungary, 
where the profitability data is available, 
they are significant and negative. Taxes 
and subsidies are in general insignificant 
(with the exception of subsidies in Po-
land), generally supporting the view ex-
pressed earlier (that government inter-
vention is unlikely to speed up restruc-
turing).  
 
* * * * * 
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Table 1 
Definition of variables and their measurement* 
 
Variables Definition and measurement 
D Total domestic demand for an industry’s products (which is equal to domestic produc-
tion plus imports minus exports). 
EXP Total exports of an industry 
IMP Total imports of an industry 
INVEMP Investment to employment ratio; the value of investment divided by the number of em-
ployee in each industry. 
P Producers’ price index for the industry. For Hungary, this is at 3-digit level and for 
the other two countries at two-digit level. 
PROF(t-1) Earnings after tax as a proportion of sales for each industry, lagged one period. 
RI Restructuring index; measured by the change in an industry’s share of employment in 
total manufacturing employment between t-1 and t. The absolute value of the change is 
used in regressions. 
RI2 Restructuring index; measured by the sum of jobs lost and jobs created in the con-
stituent firms of an industry, divided by industry employment, between t-1 and t. This 
index is used for Hungary only where firm level data is available.  
SALES Total sales of an industry  
SECTOR Dummy variable indicating the sector (two-digit level) to which each industry belongs. 
SUB Subsidies received by firms in an industry as a proportion of industry’s sales. 
TAX Total taxes paid by firms in an industry, including profit tax, social and health contri-
butions, local taxes, etc. as a proportion of industry’s sales. 
ULC Unit labour cost; calculated as total cost related to labour (gross wages and salaries 
plus social and health contributions paid by employers) divided by sales of the indus-
try. 
UMC Unit material cost; calculated as total cost of material used in production divided by 
sales of the industry. 
* Some variables are squared for the identification of non-linear relation. In these cases ‘SQ’ is added to 
their notations. 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics for all variables 
 
 No. of  
Observations Mean 
Standard. 
Deviation Min Max 
Poland      
D 456 4907907 5299303 61733.07 4.23E+07 
EXP 456 1104477 1572761 15193.68 1.38E+07 
INVEM 379 14.18313 17.53491 0.268758 170.4369 
Prof(t-1) 455 0.014921 0.049992 -0.23956 0.238289 
RI1 455 0.079525 0.129633 6.69E-06 2.181858 
SUB 456 0.003657 0.016278 0 0.225626 
TAX 456 0.01604 0.010523 9.97E-05 0.064234 
ULC 375 0.194064 0.085611 0.020723 0.4963 
UMC 456 0.439804 0.12014 0.133131 0.709189 
Logarithms:      
D 456 14.93056 1.039391 11.03057 17.5603 
EXP 456 13.22584 1.228916 9.628634 16.44018 
IMP 456 13.74873 1.306172 9.036074 16.30042 
INVEM 379 2.223883 0.900369 -1.31394 5.138365 
SALES 456 14.67724 1.14348 9.700281 17.49938 
SUB 438 -7.2612 1.931245 -15.4845 -1.48888 
TAX 456 -4.39514 0.847652 -9.21318 -2.74523 
ULC 375 -1.74981 0.503958 -3.87651 -0.70057 
UMC 456 -0.86534 0.312736 -2.01642 -0.34363 
Czech Republic      
Logarithms:      
D 340 12.40053 1.344937 7.452103 14.8169 
EXP 429 11.79605 1.366783 7.852194 15.07612 
IMP 430 11.9155 1.330109 8.389853 14.45007 
INVEM 340 4.353753 0.857655 1.443218 7.187701 
RI1 423 -2.29657 1.706236 -9.35193 4.585599 
SALES 425 12.35024 1.385032 7.976647 15.41558 
SUB 403 -7.96037 1.880501 -15.065 -3.50266 
TAX 425 -6.16783 0.684075 -8.60212 -3.2142 
ULC 340 -1.80352 0.461828 -2.9505 -0.70187 
UMC 340 -0.77588 0.293462 -2.18011 -0.18627 
Hungary      
SAL 393 1.03e+08 1.75e+08 285729 1.41e+09 
Logarithms:      
D 190 17.37117 1.581513 12.69506 21.06024 
EXP 295 16.56049 1.942372 6.47728 20.94423 
IMP 297 16.32363 1.88822 10.51825 20.67216 
INVEM 294 -2.96487 0.698883 -7.14221 0.829667 
P 294 4.669921 0.062459 4.220977 5.149237 
PROF(t-1) 263 -3.21194 0.884821 -7.16282 -1.23722 
RI1 294 -2.52718 1.254785 -7.50599 0.587484 
SUB 282 -7.12218 2.515374 -15.4375 -3.37281 
TAX 293 -5.18263 1.090777 -11.7168 -3.1542 
ULC 196 -1.87715 0.510973 -3.66126 -0.9208 
UMC 295 -0.36737 0.155693 -1.3043 0.015601 
For the Czech Republic and Hungary only logarithmic versions of variables have been used (except for 
the ‘Sales’ variable which has been used in a semi-log form). For Poland, both ordinary values and 
logarithmic versions have been used. 
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Table 3 
The impact of demand on firms’ output in the three new member states 
 
Dependent Variable: SALES  
Hungary 
98-01 
Poland 
95-01 
Czech Republic 
97-01 
IMP 0.241*** (0.001) 
0.086*** 
(0.000) 
0.222*** 
(0.000) 
EXP 0.320*** (0.000) 
0.485*** 
(0.000) 
0.568*** 
(0.000) 
P -0.089 (0.778)   
Model Estimation Re Re Re 
SECTOR dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Functional form Log log Log log Log log 
No. of observations 292 531 424 
R2 0.571 0.675 0.826 
Notes: All equations include a constant term. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%. For the precise definition of vari-
ables, see Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
The impact of supply factors on firms’ output in the three new member states 
 
Dependent Variable: SALES  
Hungary 
98-01 
Poland 
95-01 
Czech Republic 
97-01 
ULC -2.720e+08*** (0.000) 
-0.875*** 
(0.000) 
-0.994*** 
(0.000) 
UMC -1.630e+08 (0.139) 
0.051 
(0.678) 
0.010 
(0.911) 
INVEMP 2.170e+07* (0.108) 
0.095*** 
(0.006) 
0.090*** 
(0.001) 
Estimation method RE RE RE 
SECTOR dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Functional form Semi log Log log Log log 
No. of observations 196 300 340 
R2 0.351 0.419 0.348 
Notes: All equations include a constant term. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%. For the precise definition of vari-
ables, see Table 1. 
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Table 5 
Factors influencing firms’ output decisions in the three new member states 
 
Dependent Variable: SALES  
Hungary 
98-01 
Poland 
95-01 
Czech Republic 
97-01 
IMP 0.216*** (0.001) 
0.065*** 
(0.005) 
0.106* 
(0.10) 
EXP 0.196*** (0.006) 
0.389*** 
(0.000) 
0.511*** 
(0.000) 
P 0.041 (0.877)   
ULC -1.036*** (0.000) 
-0.509*** 
(0.000) 
-0.739*** 
(0.000) 
UMC -0.590* (0.096) 
-0.127 
(0.231) 
0.010 
(0.912) 
INVEMP 0.050 (0.151) 
0.032 
(0.316) 
0.072*** 
(0.012) 
TAX -0.053* (0.073) 
0.026 
(0.213) 
0.051 
(0.168) 
SUB 0.016 (0.159) 
0.007 
(0.530) 
-0.010 
(0.269) 
Estimation method RE RE RE 
SECTOR dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Functional form Log log Log log Log log 
No. of observations 192 290 319 
R2 0.613 0.736 0.802 
Notes: All equations include a constant term. 
* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; and 
*** significant at 1%.  
For the precise definition of variables, see Table 1. 
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Table 6 
Determinants of industrial restructuring in the three new member states 
 
Dependent Variable: R1 
 
HUNGARY 
98-01 
POLAND 
95-01 
CZECH REP 
97-01 
D -0.218* 
(0.051) 
1.51e-09 
(0.281) 
-0.189* 
(0.063) 
EXP -0.044 
(0.622) 
-3.76e-09 
(0.397) 
-0.237** 
(0.019) 
ULC -0.317 
(0.383) 
-0.151 
(0.156) 
-0.175 
(0.581) 
UMC -0.097 
(0.931) 
0.010 
(0.866) 
0.686** 
(0.024) 
INVEMP 0.068 
(0.707) 
9.11e-05 
(0.819) 
0.394*** 
(0.002) 
PROF(t-1) -0.259** 
(0.042) 
-0.476*** 
(0.000)  
TAX -0.119 
(0.396) 
-0.109 
(0.873) 
-0.108 
(0.461) 
SUB 0.005 
(0.930) 
2.853*** 
(0.000) 
0.016 
(0.691) 
Estimation method RE RE RE 
SECTOR dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Functional form Log log Levels Log log 
No. of observations 170 300 239 
R2 0.177 0.304 0.298 
Notes: All equations include a constant term. 
* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; and 
*** significant at 1%. 
For the precise definition of variables, see Table 1. 
 
 
